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1. Introduction 
Empirically, the simultaneous occurrence of currency and sovereign debt crises 
is a rather frequent phenomenon.
1 Nevertheless the literature on currency crises and 
sovereign defaults usually neglects the question of how the two types of crises might 
be related and typically treats currency and debt crises as independent events. 
This may be a severe shortcoming especially on the empirical side. The external 
debt level of countries for example is a significant determinant of currency crises in 
many studies. However, an important but open question is through which channels a 
high level of debt may lead to depreciation. Does a higher debt level increase the risk 
of a currency crisis directly? Or does it in a first step increase the probability of a debt 
crisis and it is actually the occurrence of the debt crisis which subsequently increases 
the risk of a currency crisis? If currency and debt crises are in fact interrelated due to 
common causes and / or direct contagion effects from one crisis type to the other, an 
explicit  consideration  of  these  interrelations  may  enhance  the  results  of  empirical 
research and maybe the quality of early warning systems also. 
As  our  main  contribution  to  the  literature,  we  empirically  analyze  the  time 
structure  of  those  crises  and  investigate  whether  both  types  of  crises  are  usually 
jointly  determined  by  common  causes  or  budget  financing,  or  whether  aspects  of 
internal contagion makes one crisis appear as consequence of the other. What we find 
is, basically, that both types of crises are significantly more likely with higher debt 
burdens. While there is a negative lagged influence of currency crises on debt crises, 
the  occurrence  of  a  currency  crisis  significantly  increases  the  risk  of  a 
contemporaneous debt crisis and vice versa, giving rise to an “internal contagion” 
hypothesis. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we shortly 
review the theoretical approaches on the determinants of currency and debt crises and 
present an in depth discussion of the potential relationship between both types of 
crises. We thereby differentiate between common causes, internal contagion effects 
from currency to debt crises and vice versa, and complementary budget financing 
aspects. We also discuss recent approaches to model the interrelations of currency and 
debt crises in an escape clause framework and present a small illustrative model. In 
                                                 
1 Reinhart (2002) finds that 84 percent of the defaults in her emerging markets sample are linked with 
currency crises while almost half of the currency crises in the sample are associated with defaults. For a 
review of various approaches to empirically identify episodes and the causes of currency crises see 
Jacobs, Kuper and Lestano (2004).    3
section 3 we analyze the empirical relationship between currency and debt crises in 
two steps. We first investigate the determinants of each of the two types of crises 
separately.  Then,  after  testing  for  Granger  causality,  we  analyze  both  crises 
employing instrumental variables techniques. 
2   Theoretical links between currency and debt crises: A review of 
the literature 
The currency crisis literature can be separated into two groups. So-called first 
generation models focus on the causes and the timing of speculative attacks, which 
force a government to abandon a fixed exchange rate. In these models the breakdown 
of an exchange rate peg is explained as the inevitable result of an excessive monetary 
policy, which is inconsistent with the exchange rate regime (e.g. Krugman 1979 and 
Flood and Garber 1984). In contrast, the basic question in the so-called escape clause 
(or second generation) literature on currency crises is not whether a government is 
technically able but whether it is willing to keep an exchange rate peg. The exit from 
a  peg  is  seen  as  a  deliberate  and  strategic  policy  choice  of  a  government  that 
maximizes public welfare by weighing the costs and benefits of the fixed exchange 
rate. Shifts in private expectations play a crucial role in these models since they enter 
the government's welfare function or its budget constraint in various ways, e.g. via an 
expectations  augmented  Phillips  curve  or  via  interest  rate  premiums.  The 
government's decision is endogenous in so far as it depends on private expectations. 
This feature typically allows for multiple equilibria with self-fulfilling devaluation 
expectations (see e.g. Obstfeld 1996, Ozkan and Sutherland 1998, and Jeanne 2000). 
In an analogous way the debt crisis literature analyzes two different aspects of 
debt repudiation, the inability and the unwillingness of debtors to meet their debt 
service obligations.
2 A large part of the ability-to-pay literature is engaged in the 
question of how to deal with excessively indebted poor countries, which are de facto 
insolvent.
3  The  basic  question  of  the  willingness-to-pay  literature  is  to  ask  why 
                                                 
2 Unlike in the currency crisis literature, however, in the debt crisis literature both aspects evolved at 
the same time. 
3 Many authors discuss multilateral and bilateral creditors’ approaches to bring down these countries’ 
external debt to a sustainable level. Recent research particularly focuses on the HIPIC initiative (see 
e.g. Gunter 2003, IMF 2002 and 2003a, and Bhattacharya 2003) and proposals to apply basic principles 
of  the  private  insolvency  law  to  sovereign  debtors.  The  IMF  for  instance  has  already  developed 
concrete  proposals  for  a  statutory  sovereign  debt  restructuring  mechanism  (SDRM,  see  e.g.  IMF   4
governments  repay  their  debt  at  all,  as  creditors  can  apply  only  very  few  legal 
institutions or sanctions to enforce their claims. Just like in the escape clause approach 
to  currency  crises,  the  answer  is  that  welfare-maximizing  governments  base  their 
decision  whether  or  not  to  honor  their  debt  on  a  cost-benefit-calculus.  They  are 
willing to service their debt only if the costs of a default, e.g. negative output effects
4 
or reputation losses, exceed the benefits of a default, i.e. avoided debt service (see e.g. 
Eaton and Gersovitz 1981, Grossman and van Huyck 1988, Cole, Dow and English 
1995).  Many  of  these  models  also  give  rise  to  multiple  equilibria  and  extensive 
research has focused on the question whether sovereign liquidity crises, which are not 
due to solvency reasons, are mainly driven by economic fundamentals or by sudden 
shifts in private creditors' default expectations (see e.g. Calvo 1988, Alesina, Prati and 
Tabellini 1990, Detragiache 1996, and Cole and Kehoe 1998).
5 
The  links  between  currency  and  debt  crises  have  rarely  been  analyzed.
6 
However, the literature on monetary and fiscal policy as well as the literature on 
financial  crises  discussed  above  incorporates  several  useful  insights  on  possible 
interrelations. In this section we review the previous literature and investigate these 
linkages, thereby differentiating between common causes, internal contagion effects 
from currency to debt crises and vice versa, and complementary budget financing 
aspects. 
 
2.1. Why currency and debt crises could be positively related I: common causes 
The simultaneous occurrence of problems in the balance-of-payments and the 
government’s budget could be due to the fact that they are caused by the same factors. 
First, negative shocks on aggregate demand might lead to a breakdown in real 
economic activity and impose market pressure on the local currency to devalue. A 
government that has committed itself to keep a fixed exchange rate peg is forced to 
sell international reserves and / or to raise the interest rate in order to defend the peg, 
thereby  worsening  the  recession.  However,  according  to  the  second-generation 
                                                                                                                                            
2003b). However, in April 2003 the Fund’s International Financial and Monetary Committee finally 
decided against the establishment of such a mechanism.  
4 See e.g. Dooley 2000, Rose 2002, and Rose and Spiegel 2002. 
5 Signalling their willingness to service their debt and to use new loans for investment rather than for 
consumption is thus important for governments to avoid liquidity crises. Marchesi and Thomas (1999) 
and Marchesi (2003) argue, that the adoption of an IMF programme can work as such a signal of “good 
intend” and is often rewarded by a subsequent debt rescheduling with private creditors. 
6 Among those are Herz and Tong (2003), Bauer, Herz and Karb (2003), and Jahjah and Montiel 
(2003), which will be discussed subsequently.   5
currency crises models, output and employment losses imply that the authorities have 
strong  incentives  to  exit  the  peg  and  fight  the  recession  by  monetary  expansion. 
Rational  speculators  recognize  the  government’s  incentives.  They  anticipate 
devaluation and withdraw their capital, thereby increasing devaluation pressure on the 
domestic  currency  and  the  costs  of  defending  the  peg.  It  finally  gives  in  to  the 
devaluation pressure, thereby validating speculators’ expectations. In addition, output 
and employment losses also have a negative impact on the government’s primary 
budget balance, as public expenditures (e.g. social transfers) tend to rise while taxable 
income shrinks. This increases the probability of sovereign default, particularly if the 
government has no further access to credits from the international capital market or 
can issue new debt only at prohibitively high interest rates. 
A second important factor that may trigger both a currency and a debt crisis is a 
rise  in  the  level  of  the  international  (real)  interest  rate.  Under  capital  mobility 
domestic debtors have to increase their interest payments if they want to rollover 
maturing debt or raise additional funds. If such an adjustment does not take place, 
substantial outflows of portfolio capital put pressure on the currency. However, if the 
adjustment  does  occur,  increased  interest  rates  may  cause  investment  and 
consumption to decline and lead to a recession with all the negative consequences for 
the  balance-of-payments  and  the  government’s  budget  that  have  already  been 
discussed. In addition, higher interest rates also directly augment the government’s 
(and  other  borrowers’)  incentive  to  default  on  its  (their)  debt,  as  debt  rollovers 
become more expensive and debt service increases. 
Finally, currency and debt crises can be caused by political, institutional and 
structural problems that may well have existed for an extended period or have been 
deteriorating  over  time  but  that  have  so  far  been  unobserved  or  unregarded  by 
international investors. Any sunspot event could trigger speculators to gather new 
relevant  information  and  /  or  to  reassess  their  information,  so  that  they  refuse  to 
rollover maturing debt, withdraw their capital, or at least demand very high interest 
rates.  By  doing  so  they  impose  high  pressure  on  the  currency  to  devalue  and 
aggravate (sovereign) borrowers’ financial problems at the same time. 
 
 
   6
2.2.  Why  currency  and  debt  crises  could  be  positively  related  II:  internal 
contagion from debt to currency crisis 
Based on the view that sovereign debt crises cause losses in trade, output, and 
employment,
7 a default may simply be seen as the source of a recession that affects 
the exchange rate through the channels described above. Furthermore, in the event of 
an imminent sovereign default rational investors do not lend additional funds to the 
sovereign debtor but try to retrieve their capital. If, in addition, speculators (correctly) 
interpret the sovereign fiscal crisis as a sign that the economy enters recession and 
crisis, they do not only claim back and refuse to roll-over the maturing debt of the 
government, but additionally remove a large part of their portfolio investments from 
the afflicted economy, thereby increasing devaluation pressure. 
 
2.3.  Why  currency  and  debt  crises  could  be  positively  related  III:  internal 
contagion from currency to debt crisis 
In response to speculative pressure on their currency peg, policymakers face a 
delicate trade-off. Both policy options, i.e. exiting and defending the peg, may lead to 
high welfare costs. Taking into account various factors such as the economy's initial 
fundamental situation, the structure of the financial markets, and the balance sheets of 
banks, firms, and its own budget, the government weighs the costs and benefits of 
each option and chooses the least costly one. 
Defending the peg implies rising interest rates, as monetary authorities increase 
short-term  interest  rates  in  order  to  stop  portfolio  capital  outflows  and  stimulate 
capital inflows.
8 If foreign investors withdraw their investments in panic, the interest 
rate  must  rise  to  a  notably  higher  level  for  as  long  as  the  threat  of  (repeated) 
speculative pressures persists. 
However, these higher interest rates increase the risk of a sovereign debt default 
through two channels. First, rising interest rates make the debt rollover and the future 
debt service more expensive and thus increase the government’s incentive to default. 
Second, high interest rates may lead into a recession as they cause aggregate demand 
to decline, especially if the interest rates have to be permanently maintained at rather 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Dooley 2000, Rose 2002, and Rose and Spiegel 2002. 
8 Defending the peg through foreign exchange market interventions also leads to rising interest rates as 
selling hard currency reserves in exchange for domestic currency effectively reduces money supply. 
Velasco (1999) comprehensively discusses the case for and against tight monetary policy and high 
interest rates in the face of speculative pressure on the local currency. Corsetti and Mackowiak (2001) 
discuss the government’s willingness to tolerate high interest rates in defending an exchange rate peg.    7
high levels to avoid ongoing speculative pressure. The number of bankruptcies and 
private debt defaults rises, tax revenues decrease, and the fiscal deficit and thus the 
risk of sovereign debt default both increase (see e.g. Flood and Jeanne 2000, Lahiri 
and Vegh 2002, 2003). 
If the government does not defend but exits the peg, it risks loosing reputation 
and output. In addition, fiscal policy also may be negatively affected so that the risk 
of a sovereign debt default increases: After devaluation it might be difficult for a 
country  to  access  the  international  capital  market.  Especially  emerging  markets’ 
currency crises are often followed by downgrades of the credit rating (see e.g. Calvo 
and Reinhart 2000a, 2000b, and Reinhart 2002). Devaluation can thus be interpreted 
as a wake-up call for international investors to re-evaluate their information about the 
economy and to reassess the country’s default risk. “devaluation can trigger financial 
panic,  expectations  of  new  depreciations,  and  hence  monstrous  interest  rates” 
(Velasco  1999,  p.16).  Investors  withdraw  their  funds  unless  the  government  is 
prepared to offer higher (default) risk premiums. For the government this again makes 
borrowing and rolling over its maturing debt more expensive, so that a sovereign debt 
default becomes more likely, which would confirm the investors’ default expectations 
to be self-fulfilling. 
Another important channel for a contagion effect from a currency to a debt crisis 
results  from  the  so-called  “original  sin”  phenomenon  (see  e.g.  Eichengreen, 
Hausmann and Panizza 2002, Jeanne 2003). In contrast to industrialized countries, 
emerging markets and developing countries are usually not able to borrow from the 
international  capital  markets  in  their  own  currencies.  As  developing  countries 
typically accumulate net external debt positions and as their few financial assets are 
usually at least partly denominated in local currency, there is a precarious currency 
mismatch in most countries’ balance sheets.  
Under original sin high debt is a double  burden  for  sovereign  borrowers.  A 
government which aims to roll-over maturing debt or wants to issue new debt has to 
convince its international creditors not only that it will be able to raise enough taxes to 
honor its debt service obligations but also that it will be able to convert these revenues 
into foreign exchange, as debt service is due in foreign currency.
9 If prices are rigid so 
that  purchasing  power  parity  does  not  hold  at  least  in  the  short  run,  a  nominal 
                                                 
9 See Mussa (2002, p. 16) for the problem of external debt in the case of Argentina’s crisis of 2000-01.   8
devaluation drastically increases costs of carrying the debt and may cause a sovereign 
debt crisis, as the government can not immediately compensate the higher real debt 
level by higher tax revenues. On the contrary, as a large part of private corporations in 
emerging markets are also indebted in foreign currency, a nominal devaluation has the 
same devastating effects on their balance sheets and can cause substantial firm and 
bank bankruptcies, thereby lowering the tax base and aggravating the fiscal crisis 
even further (see e.g. Mishkin 1996). 
 
2.4. Why currency and debt crises could be negatively related: budget financing 
So far we have focused on hypotheses of why currency and debt crises could be 
positively  connected.  However,  the  two  types  of  crises  may  also  be  negatively 
connected via the government’s budget constraint. There are alternative ways for the 
government  to  finance  its  regular  expenditures  and  to  balance  the  budget.  If  the 
budgetary  position  is  strained,  the  government  may  reduce  expenditures,  increase 
taxes, try to roll-over maturing debt and to issue new debt, generate seigniorage, i.e. 
impose  an  inflation  tax  through  monetary  expansion,  and  /  or  refuse  debt  service 
payments coming due (debt default).  
The government has to choose among these five options in every period. If it 
cannot or does not want to reduce expenditures and increase taxes e.g. due to political 
pressure, and if furthermore the government may not resort to further borrowing from 
the international capital markets, then a monetary expansion, which induces inflation 
and devaluation pressure, and a sovereign debt default are the only alternatives to 
balance the budget. To the extent that the government chooses to finance its budget by 
printing money, the need of financing through a debt default declines and vice versa. 
Thus, as far as the question of budget financing is concerned, the occurrence of a 




2.5. Integrated approaches based on the escape clause literature  
Several  authors  had  referred  to  the  mechanism  of  budget  financing  through 
inflation  as  a  major  source  of  currency  crises  in  the  so-called  first  generation  of 
                                                 
10 Early work on this linkage was done by Cline (1983) and Edwards (1984), who, however, did not 
formalize their hypothesis in a theoretical model and did not find empirical evidence to support it 
either.   9
currency crisis models. But only recently, a number of authors introduced several of 
the  possible  linkages  presented  above  into  a  common  currency  and  debt  crisis 
framework  and  by  doing  so  started  to  analyze  their  combined  effects  and 
interrelations.  
Based  on  the  escape  clause  approach,  this  literature  assumes  that  the 
government does not make its decisions whether to keep or exit an exchange rate peg 
and whether to honor its debt separately. It rather considers that its debt policy affects 
its exchange rate policy and vice versa. The decision to abandon the peg may well be 
a decisive factor in the government’s debt policy considerations as it may change the 
welfare costs and benefits of a default, while the decision to default on its debt in turn 
can be crucial for the government’s exchange rate policy as it may affect the costs and 
benefits  of  devaluation.  Models  of  this  kind  typically  embody  the  following 
ingredients:  First,  there  is  a  welfare  function,  which  the  government  maximizes. 
Second, the two policy parameters, i.e. the decision whether or not to exit the peg and 
whether or not to default on its maturing debt, affect variables in the welfare function 
either in the same or the opposite direction via the linkages presented above. Third, in 
maximizing public welfare the government is bound by its budget constraint, which 
implies that inflation / devaluation and debt default are alternative means of financing 
a budget deficit.
11 
Herz and Tong (2003) assume the government being unable or not willing to 
raise additional taxes and analyze the government’s budget financing trade-off. If tax 
revenues are not sufficient to finance the sum of expenditures and debt service due, 
the government chooses among the alternatives of defaulting on (a fraction of) its 
maturing debt or / and expanding money supply, which would cause inflation and, 
due to the assumption of purchasing power parity, a devaluation. The joint incentives 
of the government and the behavior of investors may lead to situations of multiple 
equilibria. If investors expect a high default rate, they demand a high interest rate. 
This  increases  sovereign  debt  service  obligations,  so  that  the  government  in  fact 
chooses a high default rate, thereby validating investors’ expectations. If, however, 
investors  expect  a  low  default  rate  and  thus  demand  a  low  interest  rate,  the 
                                                 
11 Obstfeld (1994) was the first to model inflation (and the subsequent exit from a fixed exchange rate 
peg) explicitly as one among several alternative instruments of budget financing, which a government 
consciously  and  strategically  chooses  from  to  maximize  public  welfare.  By  doing  so,  he  already 
established the grounds for this new escape-clause twin currency and debt crisis literature, even though 
he actually did not consider the possibility of a debt default but analyzed the trade-off between inflation 
and taxes as alternative means of budget financing only.   10
government chooses the small default rate, thereby again validating the investors’ 
expectations. As via higher interest rates higher default expectations imply a higher 
absolute level of the government’s need of budget financing and as the government 
simultaneously  uses  both  the  default  and  the  monetary  instrument  to  finance  its 
budget, the high-interest-high-default-rate equilibrium furthermore implies a higher 
inflation and devaluation rate than the low-interest-low-default-rate equilibrium as 
well and thus leads to a much higher overall welfare loss. The government would 
therefore prefer the low default solution. Nevertheless, the high default situation is the 
only rational outcome if the bond market settles at the high interest rate. Herz and 
Tong  (2003)  also  illustrate  that  with  improving  economic  fundamentals  the  bad 
equilibrium  disappears.  In  this  respect  their  results  are  thus  consistent  with  the 
traditional escape clause literature. 
Bauer, Herz and Karb (2003) also analyze the optimal debt and exchange rate 
policy depending on the default expectations of private investors. They assume that 
the exit from a fixed exchange rate peg causes investors to reassess their information 
about  both  the  country’s  economic  state  and  the  sovereign’s  creditworthiness. 
Investors demand higher interest risk premiums and the government’s debt rollover 
thus becomes more expensive in the course of devaluation. These rising credit costs 
are  only  relevant  for  the  government’s  devaluation  decision,  however,  if  the 
government plans to service its debt. In the case of a default, the government looses 
access to the capital market so that it no longer needs to consider devaluation-caused 
credit costs in its exchange rate policy. Bauer, Herz, and Karb (2003) find that the 
way and the extent to which the government’s default decision affects its devaluation 
decision  and  vice  versa  depends  on  both  the  absolute  level  of  debt  and  the 
fundamental situation of the economy. Generally, just like in most pure debt crisis 
models,  the  government’s  incentive  to  default  rises  with  a  higher  level  of  debt. 
Furthermore, just like in most pure currency crisis models, the government’s incentive 
to exit the fixed exchange rate peg rises with deteriorating fundamentals. However, in 
some situations a low debt level can substitute good fundamentals in preventing a 
currency crisis while good fundamentals can substitute a low debt in preventing a 
default. Intermediate debt levels and intermediate fundamentals give rise to multiple 
equilibria, in which private investors' default expectations are self-fulfilling. In certain 
constellations of debt levels and fundamentals private default expectations do not only 
trigger a self-fulfilling sovereign debt crisis but make a devaluation advantageous as   11
well, so that a crisis in the sovereign debt market spreads to the currency market and 
causes a currency crisis, too. 
Jahjah and Montiel (2003) analyze a welfare-maximizing government’s budget-
financing  trade-off  between  debt  repudiation  and  taxation.  They  assume  the  local 
price level to be rigid so that purchasing power parity does not hold. Any change in 
the nominal exchange rate therefore implies a change in the real exchange rate in the 
same amount. Consequently, in the face of devaluation the “original sin” hypothesis 
becomes relevant, i.e. in the course of devaluation the real value of government debt, 
which is assumed to be entirely denominated in foreign currency, increases. Together 
with its budget constraint the government’s incentives imply that with a rising level of 
(real) debt the government finances its rising real debt service obligations by a higher 
rate  of  default  rather  than  by  increased  taxation,  i.e.  devaluation  leads  to  higher 
default ratios. When the rate of devaluation reaches a critical amount, the government 
chooses a default ratio of 100 percent (total default). 
An  important  implication  of  Jahjah  and  Montiel’s  analysis  is  that  a 
government’s  ability  to  borrow  from  the  international  capital  markets  in  foreign 
currency increases if the government credibly commits itself to keep the exchange 
rate fixed under a hard peg. If, in contrast, investors have to worry about a potential 
devaluation, which would lead to a higher default ratio for any given nominal level of 
foreign debt, they rationally reduce their loans to the government. 
 
2.6. A simple model  
Disregarding market participants’ expectations and the interaction of investors’ 
behavior and the government’s policy decisions, in the following we present a simple 
model which combines the welfare optimizing government’s incentives and its budget 
constraints. We show that even in this very restricted framework the optimal fiscal 
and debt policy does not only depend on fiscal but also on monetary fundamentals. 
Analogously, the optimal exchange rate policy does not only depend on monetary but 
also on fiscal fundamentals. Put another way, already this simple framework implies 
an interrelation between the optimal debt policy and the optimal exchange rate policy. 
Taking  into  account  further  aspects  such  as  investors’  expectations  and  time 
consistency problems would generate further and more complex interrelations.  
The model focuses on a government with foreign currency denominated debt. 
Prices are fixed in the short run, so that changes in the nominal exchange rate imply   12
changes in the real exchange rate of the same amount. Following Jahjah and Montiel 
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where G is government consumption, t is the tax rate, and D is the government’s 
foreign  currency  debt  service.  To  explicitly  exclude  the  effects  of  private 
bondholders’ expectations on future interest rates, the possibility to issue new debt 
and / or to roll over the old debt is not considered.   is the default rate on the debt 
service coming due. Combining (1) and (2) yields  
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With all other variables in (3) assumed to be exogenous, the default rate   , which the 
government  chooses  to  balance  its  budget,  depends  on  its  monetary  policy  which 
determines the exchange rate S. 
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The term  (1 t)Y    gives disposable income. The term 
2 b SD     captures the social 
costs of default, which increase with the amount of repudiated debt service. S0 is the 
parity of a fixed exchange rate system, which the government has announced and kept 
so  far.  We  assume  that 
*
0 S S   ,  i.e.  initially  the  exchange  rate  is  overvalued  and 
output is lower than Y
* according to (1). The term     
2
0 0 c (S S )/S      reflects the costs   13
of a change in the exchange rate, e.g. the monetary authorities’ loss in reputation 
resulting from a deviation of the actual exchange rate S from the announced level S0. 
The  parameters  b  and  c  measure  the  relative  weight  of  the  default  costs  and  the 
devaluation costs with regard to the government’s welfare considerations. Combining 
(1), (3), and (4) yields 
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(5) 
Maximizing  W subject to S determines the welfare optimizing exchange rate Sopt, 
which by (3) also determines the corresponding optimal sovereign default rate    opt. 
Figures 1 and 2 show how the costs of a default (parameter b) and the costs of a 
change in the exchange rate (parameter c) affect both the government’s choice of the 
exchange rate Sopt and the default rate   opt.
12 
Not surprisingly, a higher weight of the costs of a default in the government’s 
cost-benefit-analysis (i.e. a higher b) is associated with a lower default rate. More 
importantly, however, it is also connected with a higher optimal exchange rate (see 
figure 1). The reason for this is that for a given level of public consumption G a lower 
default rate forces the government to increase its tax revenues to balance its budget. If 
the  government  is  not  able  or  willing  to  raise  the  tax  rate  t,  e.g.  due  to  political 
pressures, the only way to do so is to stimulate output Y by choosing a higher amount 
of devaluation, thereby weighing the costs of a larger change in the exchange rate and 
the costs of a higher default rate.  
A higher weight of the costs of a change in the exchange rate in the welfare 
function (i.e. a higher c) is related to a smaller exchange rate change and thus to a 
lower exchange rate level Sopt. At the same time, it is also associated with a higher 
default rate   opt (see figure 2). The intuition for this is that higher costs of a change in 
the exchange rate and the resulting lower exchange rate level lead to a lower real 
output  Y  and  thus  to  lower  sovereign  tax  revenues.  To  balance  its  budget,  the 
government has to choose a higher rate of default. 
                                                 
12 In figures 1 and 2 the variables and parameters are set to Y
*=1, G=0.3, B=0.2, t=0.45, S0=0.7, S
*=1, 
and a=2.5. In figure 1 the exchange rate change cost parameter is set to c=5. In figure 2 the default cost 
parameter is set to b=10.  
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3. Empirical estimation of the relationship between debt crises and 
currency crises 
In this section, the various hypotheses developed so far are confronted with 
actual data. The empirical literature on financial crises suggests two alternative ways 
of defining crises episodes, one that may be described as an event approach and one 
that may be characterized as an index method. The event approach focuses on market 
events to identify crises. Sharp nominal depreciations for instance could be used to 
identify currency crises (see e.g. Frankel and Rose 1996). In the same vein events 
such as Paris or London Club treatments could be used as indicators of debt crises. 
Though the event approach method may seem pretty attractive to use as the required 
qualitative  data  are  generally  rather  easy  to  collect  and  due  to  its  simplicity  and 
feasibility,  it  is  subject  to  a  number  of  conceptual  shortcomings.  Both  the 
identification of crisis episodes and the determination of the timing of crises are likely 
to be arbitrary, e.g. the choice of the threshold to distinguish between “normal” and 
“sharp” depreciations or the interpretation of successfully defended fixed exchange 
rates as currency crises.
13 
We therefore apply the second way of identifying crisis episodes and define an 
index of various variables, which jointly indicate whether a crisis is existent. We use 
this index method for the definition of both currency and debt crises. As not all crises 
are equally severe, we do not simply construct dummies for the occurrence of a crisis. 
Instead we use the index as a continuous variable, which allows us to measure and 
account for the severity of individual crisis episodes.  
Ideally, a country should be defined as being in a (sovereign) debt crisis if 
a)  the government is in arrears on interest or principal and/or, 
b)  the government cannot borrow private capital at reasonable interest rates. 
Unfortunately, we do not have data on interest rate spreads for a sufficiently 
large  number  of  countries.  Our  index  therefore  consists  of  the  sum  of  arrears  of 
principal and interest relative to the sum of debt service due. Section 3.4. provides an 
alternative index using average interest rates on private and official credits instead of 
                                                 
13 Ho and von Hagen (2003) extensively discuss the problems of the event method in the context of 
banking crises.    16
interest rate spreads on government bonds. As this analysis shows, most of our results 
are rather robust to the exclusion of interest rates from the index. 
Our definition of currency crises follows Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and 
Reinhart  (2002).  The  resulting  index  is  an  average  of  the  rate  of  change  of  the 
exchange  rate  and  of international  reserves, weighed by their standard deviations. 
Ideally, one would also like to include interest rates that monetary authorities can use 
to  defend  parities.  However,  this  leaves  us  with  a drastically  reduced sample,  so, 
following Reinhart (2002), we do not include interest rates.  
To assess the relationship between debt crises and currency crises empirically, 
we use a panel of 80 non-industrialized countries. Our data cover the years 1975-
2000. Some of the data are not available for all countries or every year. Therefore, our 
panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of 
explanatory variables. All variables, their precise definitions and data sources as well 
as the exact formula used to derive the index for currency crises are listed in the 
Appendix. 
The following analysis focuses on the risk of running into crisis instead of 
fixing  a  certain  (arbitrary)  threshold  where  countries  are  defined  as  experiencing 
crises. Nevertheless it is instructive to see how often our indices exceed values that 
could indicate such crises. Table 1 contains the number of crisis events,  where  a 
country is defined as experiencing a currency crisis when its index is one standard 
deviation greater than the index mean and a debt crisis when more than 75 percent of 
a country’s debt service due is not settled. According to this definition, there have 
been  280  debt  and  179  currency  crises  during  our  sample  period.  In  34  cases, 
countries experienced both currency and debt crisis at the same time. 
As possible determinants of both debt and currency crises, a huge number of 
variables has been suggested in the literature. From sources commonly used in cross-
country  time-series  estimation,  we  could  obtain  data  for  51  of  those  variables 
belonging to the groups just defined.
14 Since many of them are highly collinear, we 
                                                 
14 The following variables are included in the data set as potential explanatory variables: the years the 
party of the chief executive has been in office; the years left in the current term; a dummy indicating 
that  the  chief  executive’s  party  controls  all  relevant  houses;  the  herfindahl  index  of  legislature 
concentration;  a  dummy  for  election  years;  indices  measuring  fractionalization  of  government, 
opposition or total legislature; shortest and longest tenure of a veto player; a measure for polarization 
between the executive party and the four principle parties of the legislature; a dummy for special 
interest government parties or chief executives; dummies indicating that the chief executive or his party 
belong to the military or are special interest; a dummy for left government parties (all Beck et al. 
2001); an index measuring competitiveness of nominating process for political office (Banks 2002); an   17
should not include all of them in a single estimation. As proposed by Boockmann and 
Dreher  (2003),  our  strategy  was  thus  to  form  groups  of  variables,  and  select  the 
variables  with  the  most  robust  impact  on  currency  or  debt  crises  by  iteratively 
replacing these variables with each other inside each of the groups. Our first step was 
to factor analyze the independent variables to recover the dimensionality of the data. 
It turned out that there are four important dimensions. The first can be interpreted as 
measuring checks and balances in the political system, the second contains variables 
relating to economic policy and outcomes, the third concerns amount and structure of 
debt and political stability, and the fourth relates to trade. 
In the iterative replacement procedure, we started with a static specification 
with two variables from each of the groups, replacing them with other covariates from 
the  groups  and  retaining  those  which  had  the  highest  number  of  statistically 
significant  coefficients.  We  dropped  variables,  which  did  not  have  a  coefficient 
significant at the five per cent level in more than a third of the regressions run. As the 
results will show, with the exception of the debt burden, this procedure leads to the 
selection  of  fairly  different  causes  of  currency  and  debt  crises,  giving  rise  to  the 
conclusion that it is not common causes that are (directly) responsible for such crises. 
We continue by first focusing on the determinants of currency crises. Second, 
we analyze which variables influence debt crises. After testing for Granger causality, 
we estimate both crises employing instrumental variables techniques. 
 
3.1. Determinants of Currency Crises 
Table 2 regresses the index of currency crises on the index of debt crises (and 
various lags of this variable). Estimation is by OLS. To account for time-invariant 
unobservable heterogeneity potentially correlated with the regressor, we use a fixed 
                                                                                                                                            
index for democracy (Marshall and Jaggers 2000); GDP per capita; current account balance; overall 
budget balance; value added in industry and agriculture; savings; (total, official and private) transfers; 
money; net domestic credit; gross fixed capital formation (all relative to GDP); GDP growth; bank 
liquid reserves to assets ratio; monetary growth; inflation; the black market premium for a country’s 
currency; (all World Bank 2003); an index for restrictions of the capital account (Dreher and Siemers 
2003);  an  index  measuring  overvaluation  of  a  currency  (Herz  and  Tong  2003);  public  and  public 
guaranteed debt; private, total and short-term debt; total debt service; total trade; exports; imports (all 
relative to GDP); population; the shares of concessional and multilateral debt in total debt; interest 
payments  relative  to  exports;  terms  of  trade  adjustment  (all  World  Bank  2001)  and  an  index  for 
political instability (Dreher 2002).   18
effects specification. Therefore, we could not include variables that do not change 
over time.
15  All standard errors are estimated robustly. 
The procedure outlined above shows that six variables are significant predictors 
of currency crises in more than a third of the regressions run: 
-  the overall budget balance relative to GDP, 
-  the black market premium for a country’s currency, 
-  public and public guaranteed long-term commercial debt relative to GDP, 
-  total (external) debt service relative to exports, 
-  a dummy indicating that the chief government executive is a military and 
-  a dummy for election years. 
These variables (with their lagged values) are included in all regressions. In addition, 
column 1 includes the contemporaneous index of debt crises, column 2 adds its first 
lag, column 3 its second lag and column 4 its third lag. Currency crises are (at least at 
the ten percent level of significance) more likely, with a lower budget balance, with 
lower debt service paid and with higher public commercial debt. The finding for debt 
service  supports  the  view  that  currency  and  debt  crises  are  alternative  means  of 
budget  finance:  With  a  higher  debt  service  it  is  preferable  for  the  government  to 
finance its budget via default and not via inflation or devaluation. At the ten percent 
level of significance, currency crises are less likely in post-election years. This is 
probably because after an election the government tries to stabilize the economy (or 
markets expect them to). Also at the ten percent level, military chief executives lead 
to a lower risk of currency crises in all but the final specifications while the black 
market premium does not influence crises. The results also show that currency crises 
are  significantly  more  likely  the  higher  the  contemporaneous  probability  of  debt 
crises. This relationship is significant at the five percent level in column 1 and stays 
significant at the ten percent level in all other specifications. Although lagged values 
of our debt crises indicator do not individually contribute explaining currency crises, 
they are jointly significant at least at the ten percent level until the inclusion of two 
lags.  
The  final  equation  explains  24  percent  of  the  variance  of  currency  crises. 
However, a test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of our models (as 
                                                 
15 Our decision to include fixed country effects is based on the results of a hausman test, showing that 
fixed effects cannot be omitted. While they help in overcoming omitted variables bias, we can thus not 
use between-country variation to estimate the coefficients.   19
suggested  by  Wooldridge  2002)  revealed  that  there  is  some  evidence  of 
autocorrelation. We therefore replicated all specifications modeling the disturbance 
term as autoregressive process (Baltagi and Wu 1999). According to the estimations 
(not shown in the Table), our results are rather robust to this modification. The only 
variable loosing significance is the dummy for military chief executives. All other 
results, including the significantly positive influence of contemporaneous debt crises 
remain. 
 
3.2. Determinants of Debt Crises 
Table 3 uses the index of debt crises as dependent variable. Again, our focus is 
on the relation between debt and currency crises. Again, we tested for fixed country 
effects and found them to be significant. As in the previous section, standard errors 
are estimated robustly. 
Our procedure of identifying relevant determinants of debt crises leads to the 
following (lagged) covariates: 
-  the share of multilateral debt in total debt, 
-  total external debt relative to GDP, 
-  exports relative to GDP, 
-  an index of restrictions on the capital account, 
-  the number of years the party of the chief executive has been in office, 
-  an index measuring polarization between the executive party and the four 
principle parties of the legislature and 
-  a country’s degree of democracy. 
Again, we start by including the contemporaneous index for currency crises and 
than  including  up  to  three  lags  in  the  following  columns.  Our  covariates  are 
significant at least at the ten percent level in all specifications, the only exception 
being the number of years the party of the chief executive has been in office, and the 
index of capital account restrictions in the final model. As the results show, debt 
crises are more likely, the higher the multilateral share in debt, the higher total debt, 
the  lower  exports,  and  the  higher  is  legislature  fractionalization.  Capital  account 
restrictions and degree of democracy are associated with a greater risk of debt crises. 
The coefficients are easy to explain: Countries usually borrow larger amounts from 
multilateral  lenders  if  their  access  to  private  capital  is  restricted.  This  could  be 
because they already experience a crisis (and our result is due to reversed causality) or   20
because  countries  with  certain  characteristics,  e.g.  corruption  and  inefficient 
bureaucracy,  are  more  frequent  clients  of  multilaterals.  Multilateral  lending  could 
even cause moral hazard with the borrower (Dreher and Vaubel 2004, Dreher 2004) 
and thus increase the risk of debt crises. The higher debt relative to GDP, the more 
likely this debt becomes unsustainable and the more likely are debt crises to occur; the 
higher exports, the easier it is for a government to get international reserves it needs 
for debt payments. Countries that are governed by one party for a long time are likely 
to become cumbersome and reforms are likely to be prevented. Reforms are also less 
likely with higher legislature polarization. Capital account restrictions usually limit 
foreign  direct  investment  flows  and  therefore  make  a  country  more  vulnerable  to 
short-term  reversals  of  capital  inflows.  In  more  democratic  countries,  planning 
horizons might be shorter, which leads to the accumulation of higher short-term debt. 
Crises become thus more likely. 
Notice that there is only limited support for the hypothesis of common causes 
for both debt and currency crises. The only variable significantly influencing either 
crisis is public debt (although in the debt-crises regressions total debt has been found 
to be the most robust debt-related variable, while it is public and public guaranteed 
commercial debt in the currency crises regressions). A one percentage point increase 
in debt increases the risk of currency crises by about half a standard deviation and the 
risk of debt crises by almost one percentage point. 
Debt crises are also significantly more likely with contemporaneous currency 
crises (“contagion”). The results for further lags are less straightforward. Currency 
crises significantly increase the risk of debt crises in the next year according to all 
specifications  and  those  in  two  years  according  to  the  final  regression.  Notice, 
however, that debt crises are significantly less likely if there has been a currency crisis 
three years before. This may simply be a hint that a contagion effect from currency to 
debt, if one appears at all, takes place rather quickly, i.e. within at most two years. 
This makes sense as the channels of such a contagion can work fast: The wake-up call 
effect  of  a  devaluation  that  leads  investors  to  reassess  their  information  of  the 
economy  and  their  estimation  of  the  default  risk  is  a  very  rapid  effect.  Investors 
withdraw their funds either as soon as possible after they get the information of an 
unexpected devaluation or not at all. They do not wait several years.  
Also,  the  devaluation-caused  rise  in  the  real  value  of  the  external  debt  (see 
original sin) is likely to be a short-term phenomenon. In the course of a currency crisis   21
the rate of nominal devaluation usually is higher than the inflation rate only in the 
short run, i.e. the real depreciation, which affects the real value of debt, is a short-term 
phenomenon. In the long run, however, it is reasonable to assume purchasing power 
parity to hold, i.e. the devaluation rate corresponds to the inflation rate. This means 
that tax revenues also rise in line with the price level and with the local currency value 
of the external debt. Thus the real burden of debt does not increase anymore in the 
long run. This implies that if the government decides to default on its debt due to a 
rise in the real value of debt, it will reach this decision either rather soon after the 
devaluation  or  not  all.  It  will,  however,  not  wait  several  years.  The  fact  that  the 
government found it preferable not to default on its debt within the two years directly 
after a currency crisis thus implies that it is rather sensible to assume that it won’t 
default in the third year either.  
Altogether, the lagged negative impact supports the view that in the middle and 
the long run the aspect of currency and debt crises as alternative means of budget 
financing  is  decisive,  while  the  contemporaneous  positive  relation  indicates  that 
contagion effects dominate in the short run. 
Currency crises are jointly significant at the one percent level in all regressions. 
75  percent  of  the  variation  in  the  dependent  variable  is  explained  by  the  final 
regression. As in the previous section we also estimated regressions modeling the 
disturbance  as  first  order  autoregressive  process.  The  number  of  years  the  chief 
executives’  party  stayed  in  office  is  then  no  longer  significant.  The  other  results 
remain. 
 
3.3. Joint Determination of Debt and Currency Crises 
As the analysis of the previous section has shown, currency crises significantly 
affect debt crises while, in turn, currency crises are significantly influenced by debt 
crises. If there is, however, a mutual relationship, the ordinary least squares technique 
applied above yields inconsistent estimates of the parameters and our equations have 
to  be  estimated  using  instrumental  variables  techniques.  To  determine  the  time 
structure in the relationship among currency and debt crises we use a dynamic model. 
Causality is defined in the sense of Granger (1969). That means that a variable x is 
causing a variable y if past values of x help to explain y once the past influence of y 
has been accounted for. 
If we have N cross-sectional units observed over T time periods, the model is:   22
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where i=1,..., N and t=1,..., T. The parameters are denoted aj and ßj, the maximal 
lag length is m,  i represents unobserved individual effects and uit is an independently 
and identically distributed stochastic error. 
Since the regressions include lagged dependent variables and individual effects, 
estimation  with  OLS  generates  biased  coefficients.  Moreover,  the  within  groups 
estimator is inconsistent in the presence of endogenous variables (Nickell, 1981). We 
therefore  apply  the  GMM  estimator  of  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991).  This  estimator 
consists in first-differencing the estimating equation and using lags of the dependent 
variable  from  at  least  two  periods  earlier  as  well  as  lags  of  the  right-hand  side 
variables  as  instruments.  Since  there  are  more  instruments  than  right-hand  side 
variables, the equations are over-identified and instruments must be weighted in an 
appropriate way. We only present results from the Arellano-Bond one-step GMM 
estimator, which uses the identity matrix as a weighting matrix. The two-step GMM 
estimator  weighs  the  instruments  asymptotically  efficiently  using  the  GMM1 
estimates. However, in small samples like the one used here, standard errors tend to 
be under-estimated by the two-step estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991: 291). 
Table 4 presents the results. The null hypothesis that debt crises have no effect 
on currency crises can be rejected at the one percent level until lag length five. As can 
be seen, currency crises also Granger cause debt crises. 
Since OLS assumes the right hand side variables to be exogenous, this casts 
doubt on our previous results. We therefore replicate our OLS regressions employing 
the GMM estimator just explained. 
We also estimate two-stage least squares regressions (2SLS), which allows for 
the  inclusion  of  endogenous  regressors  that  are  dependent  variables  from  other 
equations  in  the  system.  This  estimator  is  a  limited  information  procedure  and 
neglects information contained in the second equation. Therefore, this technique is 
less efficient than three-stage least squares (3SLS), but nevertheless consistent. As is 
well known, there will always be a trade-off between the robustness of the 2SLS 
estimator and the efficiency of 3SLS. 
Our  final  method  of  estimation  is  thus  3SLS.  In  the  first  stage,  3SLS  uses 
instruments for all endogenous variables. These instruments are the predicted values 
resulting from a regression of each endogenous variable on all exogenous variables   23
included in the system. The second stage consistently estimates the covariance matrix 
of the equation errors using the residuals from the 2SLS estimation of each equation. 
In the third stage, GLS estimation employing the covariance matrix estimated in the 
second stage and the instruments in place of the endogenous variables is performed. 
Table 5 shows the results. According to almost all specifications, debt crises 
significantly increase the risk of running a currency crisis, while debt crises become 
significantly more likely with contemporaneous currency crises. The magnitude of the 
coefficients  estimated for the index of debt crises  do, however,  vary widely.  The 
smallest coefficient implies that an increase in the risk of debt crises by ten percentage 
points increases the risk of currency crises by about 2 standard deviations. According 
to the highest coefficient, such a change would lead to an increase in risk that is 20 
standard deviations higher. The coefficient for currency crises is more stable across 
our models, ranging from 0.0001 to 0.005. The results also show that currency crises 
are significantly influenced by total debt service, while total debt (relative to GDP), 
exports (relative to GDP), and legislature polarization increase the risk of running a 
debt crisis. 
On the basis of the homoscedastic Arellano-Bond estimator, a Sargan test on the 
validity of the instruments can be conducted. As can be seen in the Table, the Sargan 
test rejects the over-identifying restrictions. While this could be due to the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, it could also signal that there are problems with the instruments 
used. The test is not defined for the robust estimator used in the regressions. The 
Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation (based on robust standard errors), 
which must not be present in the data in order for the estimator to be consistent, 
accepts the specifications at the ten percent level of significance.
16 
Only a small share of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the 
explanatory variables in most specifications. The exception is the debt crises model 
with  the  lagged  dependent  variable  included.  The  coefficient  of  the  lagged 
endogenous  variable  in  the  final  specification  indicates  that  39  percent  of  the 
adjustment takes place within the first year. 
In summary, our results indicate that debt crises are significant predictors of 
currency crises, while currency crises significantly increase the risk of debt crises. We 
do  not  find  evidence  for  the  hypothesis  that  both  crises  are  caused  by  the  same 
                                                 
16  The  same  is  true  if  the  explanatory  variables  are  treated  as  predetermined  instead  of  strictly 
exogenous.   24
exogenous variables. The next paragraph discusses a possible extension of the index 
for debt crises by an interest rate component. 
 
3.4. Discussion of an alternative indicator 
This section proposes an alternative indicator for measuring debt crises. It adds 
an interest rate component to the index of debt crises and tests whether the results of 
the previous sections are robust to this change. 
In principle, the difference between the interest rate a government has to pay for 
private loans and the market interest rate is a measure of crisis. As one problem, 
however, countries might not borrow in private capital markets at all and the interest 
rate is therefore equal to zero. This could either be because there is no crisis, and a 
country  does  not  want  to  borrow  in  foreign  currency  or,  alternatively,  because  a 
country gets no private credit although it would like to. In the latter case, the country 
borrows  from  official  creditors.  Those  official  loans  are  probably  more  highly 
subsidized when a country is in crisis. This is because the share of (higher interest) 
export credits in official loans usually declines at those times. The majority of those 
countries for which there are zero interest rates on private loans in the sample are 
eligible to the IMF’s low interest facility. Since the share of IMF credits in official 
loans rises during crises, the average official interest rate declines. 
We thus add a second part to our index, consisting of the amount the interest 
rate for new private loans exceeds the average interest rate for all countries and, if the 
interest  rate  on  private  loans  is  zero,  the  interest  subsidy  obtained  from  official 
creditors, i.e., the difference between the average interest rate for private capital and 
the interest rate paid for new official loans. This part of the index is zero if the country 
can borrow on lower than average interest – and we omit the eight cases where a 
country received neither private nor official loans in a year. The two parts of the index 
enter the overall index with positive sign and are weighed with their country specific 
standard deviations. The exact formula used in calculating the index is shown in the 
Appendix. 
Table  7  reproduces  the  frequency  of  crises  using  the  revised  index  where  a 
country is defined to be in a crisis, if its respective index is by one standard deviation 
greater than the mean. The results do not change substantially. As can be seen, there 
are now 45 joint debt and currency crises during 1975-2000.   25
Our final step was to replicate all regressions with this index (not reported in 
tables). Again, there are no substantial changes. In the static regressions (of Table 2 
and 3), the coefficient of debt crises becomes insignificant when lagged values are 
included,  whereas  currency  crises  remain  robust  determinants  of  debt  crises. 
Similarly,  the  results  for  debt  crises  are  weaker  in  the  instrumental  variables 
regressions,  with  insignificant  coefficients  in  the  dynamic  specifications.  The 
influence of currency crises on debt crises, to the contrary, becomes even stronger. 
In summary, there is no evidence that the omission of an interest rate component 
to the index of debt crises changes results significantly. 
 
4.  Summary 
Theoretically, currency and debt crises can be related in various ways, both 
negatively and positively. Empirically, we find only weak evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis that common causes lead to simultaneous currency and debt crisis. Public 
debt is the only variable that was significantly associated with both types of crises. In 
OLS-estimations currency crises are significantly more likely with a high probability 
of a contemporaneous debt crisis, while debt crises are significantly more likely with 
contemporaneous currency crises. However, debt crises are significantly less likely if 
a currency crisis took place three years before. These findings may indicate that a 
contagion effect from currency to debt crises and vice versa, if it exists at all, takes 
place  rather  quickly.  As  the  possible  channels  of  internal  contagion  should  work 
rather fast, this view is consistent  with our theoretical considerations. The lagged 
negative  relation  indicates  that  the  hypothesis  of  currency  and  debt  crises  as 
alternative means of budget financing dominates in the middle and the long run. The 
budget-financing hypothesis is supported by the finding that currency crises are more 
likely with a lower budget balance and lower debt service paid. The positive short-
term relation between currency and debt crisis remains valid if we apply instrumental 
variables techniques. 
   26
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Appendix A: Tables 
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Notes: A country is defined as being in a currency crisis if its index is one standard 
deviation above the mean. A country is in a debt crises, if its arrears on principal and 
interest exceed 75% of debt service due.   32
Table 2: Determinants of Currency Crises (panel data, 76 countries, 1975-2000) 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Debt crises, index  15.96  15.71  16.05  16.44 




Debt crises, index (t-1)    0.39  0.13  0.30 
    (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.06) 
Debt crises, index (t-2)      0.01  -9.49 
      (0.00)  (0.97) 
Debt crises, index (t-3)        12.12 
        (1.71
o) 
Overall budget balance  -0.28  -0.28  -0.29  -0.30 
    (relative to GDP, t-1)  (2.08**)  (2.01**)  (1.86
o)  (1.84
o) 
Black market premium  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
    (t-1)  (0.95)  (0.95)  (0.90)  (0.89) 
Public and public guaranteed   24.27  24.14  24.21  24.61 
    debt (relative to GDP, t-1)  (3.58*)  (3.30*)  (3.18*)  (3.17*) 
Total (external) debt service  -0.27  -0.27  -0.28  -0.30 
    (relative to exports, t-1)  (2.85*)  (2.92*)  (2.91*)  (2.91*) 
Military chief executive,  -4.76  -4.75  -4.83  -4.84 
    Dummy (t-1)  (1.72
o)  (1.69
o)  (1.66
o)  (1.63) 






         
R squared (within)  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.24 
Joint significance of debt 
variables (p-value) 
  0.03  0.07  0.11 
Number of countries  83  83  83  81 
Number of observations  1005  1003  981  948 
 
Notes: 
The coefficients of the country dummies are not reported. 
Robust (White) t-statistics are shown in parentheses: 
*: significant at the 1 percent level   
**: significant at the 5 percent level 
o: significant at the 10 percent level.   33
Table 3: Determinants of Debt Crises (panel data, 76 countries, 1975-2000) 
Explanatory Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Currency crises  0.0003  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (3.51*)  (6.31*)  (6.18*)  (6.17*) 
Currency crises (t-1)    0.0002  0.001  0.001 
    (2.49**)  (4.96*)  (4.14*) 
Currency crises (t-2)      -0.0001  0.001 
      (1.19)  (6.43*) 
Currency crises (t-3)        -0.0004 
        (3.45*) 
Multilateral debt   0.004  0.004  0.005  0.01 
    (relative to total debt, t-1)  (5.35*)  (5.49*)  (5.24*)  (5.66*) 
Total debt (relative to GDP, t-1)  0.17  0.16  0.17  0.22 
  (4.75*)  (4.74*)  (4.09*)  (6.73*) 
Exports (relative to GDP, t-1)  -0.35  -0.37  -0.39  -0.46 
  (3.79*)  (3.98*)  (4.17*)  (4.69*) 
Index for capital account restrictions  0.10  0.08  0.07  0.05 
    (t-1)  (3.47*)  (2.26**)  (1.92
o)  (1.45) 
Chief executives’ party years in office  0.001  0.001  0.003  -0.002 
    (t-1)  (1.04)  (0.67)  (0.28)  (0.21) 
Legislature polarization (t-1)  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.04 
  (3.45*)  (3.63*)  (3.86*)  (3.25*) 
Degree of democracy  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
  (3.02*)  (2.57**)  (2.06**)  (1.77
o) 
         
R squared (within)  0.74  0.74  0.75  0.76 
Joint significance of debt variables (p-
value) 
  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Number of countries  77  77  77  77 
Number of observations  1128  1103  1072  1033 
 
Notes: 
The coefficients of the country dummies are not reported. 
Robust (White) t-statistics are shown in parentheses: 
*: significant at the 1 percent level   
**: significant at the 5 percent level 
o: significant at the 10 percent level.   34
Table 4: Causality tests on Currency and Debt Crises (panel data, 76 countries, 
1975-2000) 
  Currency Crises  Debt Crises 
Debt Crises (t-1)  33.56  24.18  29.20  30.15  31.13  0.73  0.79  0.75  0.76  0.80 
Debt Crises (t-2)    7.02  3.51  5.85  6.30    -0.04  -0.04  -0.05  -0.07 
Debt Crises (t-3)      1.90  -5.13  -5.17      -0.02  0.004  0.001 
Debt Crises (t-4)        12.17  14.05        -0.05  -0.04 
Debt Crises (t-5)          -5.57          -0.01 
                     
Currency Crises (t-1) 0.02  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.09  -0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Currency Crises (t-2)   0.01  -0.11  -0.10  -0.11    -0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Currency Crises (t-3)     0.01  -0.11  -0.10      -0.00  0.00  0.00 
Currency Crises (t-4)       -0.00  -0.04        -0.00  0.00 
Currency Crises (t-5)         -0.00          -0.00 
p-value for (joint) 
significance of 
currency crises 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.004 
p-value for (joint) 
significance of debt 
crises 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 7: Frequency of Debt and Currency Crises (including interest component) 
 
    Currency Crises 
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Notes: A country is defined as being in a crisis if its respective index is one standard 







   
   
( )*( ) ( )*( )
1 1
1 1    
   
 
  ex   : Standard deviation of the exchange rate 
 ex   : Change of the exchange rate with respect to the previous year 
ext 1 : Exchange rate in the previous year 
  res  : Standard deviation of stock of international reserves 
 res  : Change in stock of international reserves with respect to the previous year 
rest 1: Stock of international reserves in the previous year 
 
Index of debt crises for the robustness analysis (Section 3.4.): 
dc ar
ar




. 0 int int int
, int int int int int
   
     
pr of av
av pr av pr
if
if  
int pr  : Yearly average of interest rates on new public loans from private creditors 
intav : Yearly average of interest rates on new public loans from private creditors 
(average for all countries) 
intof  : Yearly average of interest rates on new public loans from official creditors 
  int  :  Standard deviation of int 
  ar   :  Standard deviation of debt in arrears and debt rescheduled (relative to total 
debt service due) 
ar    :   Principal and interest in arrears (relative to total debt service due) 
   39
Appendix C: Definitions and data sources 
Variable  Source  Definition 
Overall budget balance 
(relative to GDP) 
World Bank 
(2003) 
Current and capital revenue and official grants 
received, less total expenditure and lending minus 
repayments for central government. 





((Parallel Exchange rate/official Exchange rate) – 
1)*100 
Public and public 




Public and publicly guaranteed long-term 
commercial loans from private banks and other 
private financial institutions. 




Total (external) debt service to exports of goods 
and services (including workers' remittances) 
Military chief executive, 
Dummy 
Beck et al. 
(2001) 
Takes a value of one if the chief executive is a 
military officer and zero otherwise. 
Election years, dummy  Beck et al. 
(2001) 
Takes a value of one for years with national 
legislative elections. 




Multilateral debt relative to total external debt.  
Total debt (relative to GDP)  World Bank 
(2001) 
Consists of public and publicly guaranteed long-
term debt, private nonguaranteed long-term debt, 
the use of IMF credit, and estimated short-term 
debt. 
Exports (relative to GDP)  World Bank 
(2001) 
Exports of goods and services are the total value 
of goods and services exported as well as income 
and worker remittances received. 




Range 0 (no restrictions) to 4 (fully restricted). 
Consists of dummies for the existence of payments 
restrictions, multiple exchange rates, surrender 
requirements and restrictions on current 
transactions. 
Chief executives’ party 
years in office 
Beck et al. 
(2001) 
Number of years the chief executive’s party has 
been continuously in office. 
Legislature polarization  Beck et al. 
(2001) 
Total fractionalization of the legislature. 
Degree of Democracy  Marshal and 
Jaggers (2000) 
Measures the general openness of political 
institutions (0 = low, 10 = high democracy score).   40
Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
(overall) 
Currency Crises Indicator  3.310  72.30 
Debt Crises Indicator  0.271  0.341 
Overall budget balance (relative to GDP)  -3.85  5.492 
Black market premium  223.1  3742.1 
Public and public guaranteed debt (relative to GDP)  0.070  0.110 
Total debt service (relative to exports)  20.31  15.01 
Military chief executive, Dummy  0.301  0.458 
Election years, dummy  0.190  0.392 
Multilateral debt (relative to total debt)  22.91  18.29 
Total debt (relative to GDP)  0.662  0.728 
Exports (relative to GDP)  0.331  0.207 
Capital account restrictions  0.641  0.28 
Chief executives’ party years in office  12.63  13.34 
Legislature polarization  0.201  0.566 
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